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6 GLOBAL ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
AND THE POTENTIAL FOR GLOBAL 
DEMOCRACY: A FUNCTIONALIST 
ANALYSIS 
Andrew Strauss 
INTRODUCTION: EINSTEIN AND FREUD 
Sigmund Freud, from whose book Civilization and its Discontents l this 
volume takes its inspiration, engaged in an exchange of letters with 
Albert Einstein in the early 1930s.2 Einstein, concerned that techno-
logical advances meant that war might destroy humanity, attempted to 
engage Freud in a dialogue and in the forming of an organization of 
moral and intellectual elites to promote his cause of world government. 
Freud answered Einstein's call for thoughtful correspondence, but was 
not optimistic about a program for world government. After all, as he 
had argued in Discontents, humans had aggressive instincts and impulses 
that were at odds with global harmony, and Freud was doubtful, given 
the then state of cultural evolution, that these could be contempor-
aneously overcome in the furtherance of an effective world authority. 
Helping shape the distinctive perspectives of Einstein and Freud 
are contrasting methodological assumptions, each of which has in 
various guises been reflected in the Western philosophical tradition 
I would like to thank Barbara Eckman for her very helpful research assistance 
with this chapter. 
1 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, in James Strachey (trans.), 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 
XXI (1961) . 
2 See Why War? A Correspondence Between Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud 
(1991 edition) . 
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since the time of the Greeks. Einstein, the rationalist, presupposed 
with Kant and many others the possibility that human behavior and 
society in general could be molded to the dictates of human reason.3 
Freud, an heir to the psychological tum in our understanding of 
ourselves that began decidedly with Hume, and was most powerfully 
advanced by Nietzsche, saw our passions and other hidden forces from 
within our psyches as the central drivers of our social institutions. 
Today most students of global institutions implicitly reject the 
assumptions of both Einstein and Freud. The World Federalists, 
who have long followed a political strategy derived from their 
Kantian belief that a rational response to the human condition 
should lead nations to suspend their rivalries and create a world 
federal state, are distinctly out of step.4 Likewise, most professional 
observers of global institutions (behavioral economists aside) eschew 
a Freudian understanding of such institutions as an amalgam of the 
complex psychology that make up individuals. 
Rather, what is implicit in the approach of most observers today is a 
third method that might be thought of as that of the political scientist. 
This method, which can be traced back most definitively to Machia-
velli, assumes that social institutions are the sum total of an underlying 
sodal dynamic resulting from a kind of reductionist notion of collective 
and individual self-interests often associated with Hobbes. 
Functionalism, as originally conceptualized by David Mitrany in 
the 1930s, is informed by such an understanding. 5 For Mitrany and 
his later adherents, international organizations emerge as a result of 
the needs of global actors to tackle specific problems that cannot be 
3 Part of Einstein's purpose, however, in attempting to enlist Freud comes out of 
a recognition of the importance of the psychological dimension to the change 
he was promoting. See See Why War? , p. 2 ("The ill success, despite their 
obvious sincerity, of all the efforts made during the last decade to reach this 
goal [of a supranational organization] leaves us no room to doubt that strong 
psychological factors are at work which paralyze these efforts"). 
4 For a comprehensive history of the world federalism movement, including the 
development and evolution of the ideology of world federalism, see Joseph 
Preston Baratta, The Politics of World Federation: From World Federalism to 
Global Governance (2004). 
5 See generally David Mitrany, The Progress of International Government (1933). 
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solved in the absence of international cooperation. Unlike most world 
federalists or other rational idealists, they do not assume the work-
ability of grand schemes for global governance, but rather, for them, 
global change comes about as a result of people individuallY and 
collectively pursuing concrete self-interested objectives. Thus, to take 
one example, for functionalists, the International Civil Aviation 
Organization was created by states in 1944 because they could not 
independently secure the safety of their newly airbound citizens over 
the global commons.6 Contemporary regime theorists such as Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye have furtl1er developed and refined the idea 
that states create international regimes in self-interested response to 
collective action problems.? 
The thesis that I wish to develop in this chapter is that a function-
alist view of the development of global institutions suggests that the 
structural inequalities in global income that were a primary cause of 
the global economic crisis of 2008, and that continue to endanger the 
world economy, have the potential to provide the political precondi-
tions for a global regime that can help redress those inequalities. To 
do so, however, such a regime must empower the less economically 
well off through representation, and the regime itself must have the 
practical ability to influence global economic policy. Such a regime, 
I will argue, must be fundamentally democratic in its character. If it 
were to be brought into existence, a democratic regime, representa-
tive of the global public, would likely weigh in on many issues beyond 
income inequality. Environmental concerns, including climate 
change, human rights, and international conflict resolution are only 
a few of the areas where a parliament might be argued to have salutary 
value. A focus on economic inequality as a matter of great saliency 
today, however, presents a useful case study for both the political 
viability and utility of such an institution. 
6 David Mackenzie, ICAO: A lliSfOlY of rhe llllel'llariollal Civil Aviarioll 
OrgallizaLion (2010). 
7 See for example Roben Keohane and Joseph Nyc, "Between Centralization 
and Fragmentation: The C lub Model of Multi lateral Cooperation and 
Problems of Democratic Legitimacy," avai lable at http: //papers.ssrn.com/soI3/ 
papers.cfmabstract_id=262175. 
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I THE MACROECONOMIC PROBLEM OF GLOBAL 
INCOME INEQUALITY AND THE GREAT RECESSION 
197 
A strong - even compelling - case can be made that income inequality 
worldwide was a primary cause of the 2008 economic crisis and that it 
continues to endanger the global economy. The thesis that income 
inequality poses a danger to economic health lays claim to a distin-
guished pedigree . To name two of the inequality thesis's most notable 
twentieth-century adherents, Marriner Eccles, a Federal Reserve 
Chairman during the Roosevelt administration, and the famed econo-
mist John Kenneth Galbraith, both saw the rise in inequality in the 
1920s as a major cause of the Great Depression. 8 Among the many 
contemporary observers supporting the view that income inequality 
was among the primary causes of the Great Recession, former IMF 
Chief Economist Raghuram Rajan makes the argument forcefully in 
his 2010 book Faultlines9 as does former Labor Secretary Robert 
Reich in his 2011 book Afiershocl~, the Next Economy and Amen'ca's 
Future. 10 
While the varied proponents of the inequality thesis have different 
emphasis and perspectives, they all share a common grounding in 
John Maynard Keynes's depression-era upending of classical 
8 For EccJcs's views, see Marriner Eccles, Beckoning Fronciers (1951); for 
Galbraith's views, see John Kenneth Galbraith, The Great Crash, 1929 (1954) . 
9 Raghuram G. Rajan, Fault Lines: How Hidden Fraaums Still Threaten the World 
Economy (2010) . 
10 Robert B. Reich, Aftershock: The Next Economy & America's Future (2011). See 
also Gustav Horn et. aI., "From the Financial Crisis to the World Economic 
Crisis: The Role of Inequality," IMK Policy Brief, Institut fur 
Makroi:ikonomie und Konjukturforschung (2009), p. 10. Other economic 
observers sounded the alarm before 2007. See Thomas 1. Palley, "Economic 
Contradictions Coming Home to Roost? Does the U.S. Economy Face a 
Long-Term Aggregate Demand Generation Problem?," J. Post Keynesian 
Econ., 25 (2002), p. 9; Heather Boushey and Christian E. Weller, "Inequality 
and Household Economic Hardship in the United States of America, Working 
Papers," United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2006); 
Robert H . Franck, Falling Behind: How Rising Inequality Harms the Middle Class 
(2007); Robert Pollin, "The Growth of U.S. Household Debt: Demand-side 
Influences," J. Macroec07lOntics, 10 (1988), p. 231. 
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economic theory. II At the root of the Keynesian understanding is the 
notion that for an economy to function at full capacity, sufficient 
aggregate demand for goods and services must exist to absorb that 
capacity. 12 If for some reason, such demand ceases to exist, producers 
will respond by lowering production, and cancelling or putting on 
hold plans to invest in expansion. 13 Lower production and less invest~ 
ment means the elimination of workers who can no longer be product~ 
ively utilized. 14 In what becomes a vicious cycle, the newly jobless 
workers are forced to cut back on their own consumption, further 
reducing demand and causing further economic contraction. 15 
The reason that high levels of income inequality affect aggregate 
demand and begin this unfortunate cycle is that the wealthier people 
become, the lower their marginal propensity to consume. Every add~ 
itional dollar obtained by someone who is living at the subsistence 
level will tend to be spent on basic necessities, such as feeding the 
family or paying the rent, while an additional dollar garnered by 
someone of wealth, whose consumer needs are likely to already be 
mostly satiated, is more likely to be saved. 16 Thus, as income 
becomes highly concentrated, wealth is transferred from the less well 
off, who will consume, to those better off, who will save, and when 
this happens, sustaining the Keynesian demand that drives the econ~ 
omy becomes problematic. 17 
11 See generally John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment Interest 
and Monlry (1936) . 
12 Ibid . 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., p. 97. There is a good deal of empirical support for this rather self-
evident proposition that with increasing wealth there is a diminishing marginal 
propensity to consume. See for example Ulrike Stein, "Zur Entwicklung der 
Sqarquoten der privaten Haushalte-ein Auswertung von Haushaltsdaten des 
SOEP," IMK Working Paper 10 - 2009 (2009) (finding that in 2007 the top 
income quartile of Germans had an average saving rate of 15.8 percent, the 
second quartile of 9 percent, the third of 8 percent and the bottom of 4.1 
percent). 
17 As Keynes put it: "up to the point where full employment prevails, the growth 
of capital depends not at all on a low propensity to consume but is, on the 
contrary, held back by it; and only in conditions of full employment is a low 
propensity to consume conducive to the growth of capital. Moreover, 
experience suggests that in existing conditions savings by institutions and 
Global Economic Inequality 199 
The period of globalization leading up to the 2008 financial crisis 
corresponded to a period of income inequality within countries and 
thus very likely established the preconditions for the deficiency in 
aggregate global demand I have described. The most common way 
economists measure income inequality is with an equation that they 
call the Gini Coefficient. Named after Corrado Gini, the Italian 
sociologist who worked out its formulation, the Gini coefficient is 
used to measure inequality in a frequency distribution. IS Thus, when 
applied to income distribution, a Gini coefficient of zero indicates 
perfect equality (everyone has the same income), and a Gini coeffi-
cient of one indicates maximum inequality (only one person has all 
the income). 19 
Given the premium that communist ideology put on economic 
equality, it is not surprising that countries transitioning away from 
planned economies saw their Gini coefficients rise significantly. 20 
When China, for example, abandoned its "iron rice bowl policy" 
following the reforms of Deng Xiaoping in the 1980's, income 
inequality exploded.21 This inequality has become even more pro-
nounced in the last decade leading China to have a Gini coefficient 
higher than the United States. 22 This rise in inequality has not been 
through sinking funds is more than adequate, and that measures for the 
redistribution of incomes in a way likely to raise the prosperity to consume 
may prove positively favourable to the growth of capital." John Maynard 
Keynes, The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money, pp. 373- 4. 
18 Corrado Gini, Van'abilica e Mutabiliui (1912). 
19 Corrado Gini, On the Measure of Concentration with Special Reference to Income 
and Statistics (1936). 
20 See Branco Milanovic and Lire Ersado, "Reform and Inequality During the 
Transition: An Analysis Using Panel Household Survey Data, 1990- 2005," 
Policy Research Working Paper 4780, The World Bank Development 
Research Group Poverty Team (2008) (examining the rise of income 
inequality in 26 post-communist countries during the period from 1990- 2005 
and concluding that its scale was unprecedented). 
21 OECD, Economic Surveys of China (2010), p. 147. 
22 Int'l Labour Org. [ILO), "Income Inequality as a Cause of the Great 
Recession? A Survey of Current Debates," Conditions of Work and 
Employment Series No. 39 (prepared by Till van Treeck and Simon Sturn), 
p. 27. One reason for China's high Gini coefficient is the very well-known gap 
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limited to transitional economies. Developing countries generally 
have tended to experience a significant rise in inequality during the 
period of neoliberal globalization which began in 1989.23 
The trend was similar in the developed world. In 2007 the Ameri-
can economy, for example, was roughly 60 percent larger than it was 
in the 1970s. Yet, the inflation adjusted income of the median male 
worker actually decreased over the period. 24 The missing gains almost 
. all found their way to those at the upper end of the income stratum· 
The wealthiest 10 percent of Americans went from appropriating 
around 35 percent of national income in the 1970s to a full 50 percent 
in 2007. 25 Even more dramatically, during this period, the noW 
infamous upper 1 percent expanded their take of national income 
from under 10 percent in the 1970s to 23 percent in 2007. 26 
Most other advanced industrial countries followed this same tra-
jectory toward inequality. According to the OEeD, its member states 
between relatively high urban and relatively low rural incomes, however, 
urban inequality in itself has increased to the point where it is almost as large 
as the Gini coefficient for total household incomes in the United States. See 
also Edward Wong, "Survey in China Shows a Wide Gap in Income," New 
York Times, July 19, 2013, p. A9 (reporting on a Peking University survey 
finding that in 2012 households in the top 5 percent income bracket 
accounted for 23 percent of China's total household income while those in the 
bottom 5 percent accounted for only 0.1 percent and estimating China's Gini 
coefficient to be 0.49). 
23 See Branko M.ilanovic, "Can We Discern the Effect of Globalization on 
Income Distribution? Evidence from Household Surveys?" World Bank Bcon. 
Rev., 19 (2005), p. 21 (describing the increased inequality in developing 
countries and suggesting causal factors related to economic openness). But 
see, Leonardo Gasparini, Guillermo Cruces and Leopoldo Tornarolli, 
"Recent Trends in Income Inequality in Latin America," in Branko M.ilanovic 
(ed.) Globalization and Inequality (2012), p. 172 (arguing that inequality has 
been decreasing in Latin America over the last five to ten years although it 
continues to be among the most unequal regions in the world). 
24 See Robert B. Reich, Aftershock, p. 19 (extrapolating earnings figures from 
Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Census Bureau figures). 
25 See Emmanuel Saez, "Striking it Richer, The Evolution of Top Incomes in 
the United States (Updated with 2011 estimates)" (2013), available at http:// 
emlab. berkeley. edu/-saezlsaez-UStopincomes-2011 . pdf). 
26 Ibid. 
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had an average Gini coefficient of 0.29 in the mid-1980s. 27 By the late 
2000s, however, this average had increased by almost 10 percent to 
0.316, having risen in seventeen of the twenty-two OECD countries 
for which sufficient data is available.28 It grew by more than 4 percent 
in Finland, Germany, Israel, Luxemberg, New Zealand, Sweden, and 
the United States. 29 The only exceptions were Turkey, Greece, 
France, Hungary, and Belgium which registered either no increase 
or small declines in their Gini coefficients.3D 
Certain high Gini coefficient countries, most notably Germany, 
Japan, and especially China, lacking sufficient internal Keynesian 
demand to absorb their excess production, attempted to compensate 
through exports? 1 
The United States in particular was a net absorber of global 
surplus production. Given its own increasingly unequal distribution 
of income, and the corresponding financial constraint on those 
middle and poorer Americans, with the highest marginal propensity 
to consume, such consumption had to be financed. As is now well 
known, such financing to a great extent took the form of easy access to 
consumer credit, most characterized by home mortgage loans.32 
In the expansion of consumer credit, the United States was again not 
alone. In the years leading up to the Great Recession, consumer debt 
soared throughout the industrialized world. According to the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, between 2002 and 2007, the ratio of house-
hold debt to income went up by an average of 39 percent until peaking at 
138 percent.33 In Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and 
Norway, debt rose to more than 200 percent of household income.34 
27 OECD, Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising (2011), p . 22. 
28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 
3 1 See Michael Pettis, The Great Rebalancing: Trade, Conflict, and the Perilous 
Road Ahead for the World Economy (2013), pp. 1- 26. 
32 Raghuram G . Rajan, Fault Lines, pp. 21-45. A significant part of global 
surplus production was (and continues to be) absorbed by the U .S. 
government financed by large federal deficits . 
33 "World Economic Outlook: Growth Resuming, Dangers Remain," 
International Monetary Fund 89 (2012), available at www.imf.orglexternall 
pu bslftlweo/20 12/0 1/pdfltext. pdf). 
34 Ibid . 
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Of course, global aggregate demand could not be maintained 
indefinitely by consumers taking on higher and higher levels of debt, 
and when the inevitable happened, and consumers began to default 
(triggered by the subprime home mortgage collapse in the United 
States), the demand necessary to fuel the economy could no longer be 
sustained. The most enduring economic contraction since the Great 
Depression was upon us. Some governments stepped in to create 
demand with old fashioned Keynesian fiscal (government spending) 
and monetary policy (central bank lowering of interest rates to 
encourage consumption and investment), but maintaining the polit-
ical will for those policies has been an uphill battle. Now, in this 
period of economic difficulty, both those who have been disadvan-
taged by the increasingly unequal distribution of income, as well as 
those who have been advantaged, have a joint interest in reviving the 
global economy. It is to understanding the practical case for global 
democracy as an impetus to sustaining such a revival that I will 
now turn. 
II GLOBALIZATION AND THE PROBLEM OF UNEQUAL 
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 
The increasing inequality of income around the world that we have 
just chronicled poses significant questions of distributive justice. One 
does not have to go so far as John Rawls - whose famous difference 
principle holds that income disparities are only justifiable to the extent 
they improve the lot of the least well off - to recognize the ethical 
challenge posed by such large-scale inequality.35 The argument that 
I wish to make in this chapter is not, however, fundamentally norma-
tive in character. Rather, with reference to functionalist analysis, 
I intend to demonstrate that such income inequality provides an 
economically instrumental rationale for global democracy. 
Significantly contributing to the income inequality phenomenon is 
the globalization system that allows industrial enterprises to raise 
funds on global exchanges and sell their products to global markets 
35 See generally John Rawls, A TheOlY OfJIIslice (rev. cd. 1999), p. 266. 
Global Economic Inequality 203 
regardless of where they set up shop. The result is a mismatch 
between the realm of the nation-state, whose confines limit the 
mobility of most workers, and the transnational realm of footloose 
commerce. While workers with specialized skills in global demand 
can command generous salaries, less skilled workers, the supply of 
which is in global surplus, have lost negotiating leverage . The advan-
tage goes to firms that can keep their compensation in check by 
transferring production offshore, or by buying from global suppliers, 
who themselves must keep compensation low to match foreign 
competitors. 36 
Is there a way around globalization's tendency toward exacerbat-
ing income inequality? The model of industrial relations that became 
most accepted in the twentieth century would answer that question by 
looking to governments to establish worker protection laws establish-
ing minimum wages, making termination of employment and plant 
closings difficult, and securing collective bargaining rights. 37 The 
ability of governments, however, to maintain pro-worker industrial 
policies of this kind has itself come under assault by the same com-
petitive dynamics of globalization that pits workers against workers 
around the globe. Countries must compete for investment capital, 
and countries with more stringent worker protections find themselves 
at a competitive disadvantage. 38 The example of worker protective 
sclerotic France is often held out as one to be avoided if governments 
want to attract the international capital that allows their economies to 
flourish. 39 
:36 See for example Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Price of Inequah'ty: How Today's Divided 
Society Endangers our Future (2012), p. 60 (maintaining that, "[t]he threat of 
capital outflow, should workers get too demanding about rights and wages, 
keeps workers' wages low"). 
:3 7 See generally Bruce E. Kaufmann, The Global Evolution of Industrial Relations: 
Events, Ideas and the lIRA (2005). 
:3 8 See for example Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality, p. 60. ("Competition 
across countries for investment takes on many forms - not just lowering wages 
and weakening worker protections. There is a broader 'race to the bottom,' 
trying to ensure that business regulations are weak and taxes are low.") 
:3 9 See for example Steven Erlanger, "Memo From France: A Proud Nation 
Halts Its Slow Decline," New Yorh Times, August 25,2013, p. 6. 
',,1 
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Alternatively, countries could compensate those who have wound 
up on the wrong side of the global income divide by resorting to 
redistributionist social welfare programs that were also held out as a 
model in the twentieth century.40 Unfortunately, however, govern-
ments are similarly hampered in their capacity to tax global enter-
prises to fund such programs by the ease with which they can relocate 
41 
to more tax friendly jurisdictions that globalization makes possible. 
These kinds of constraints on the abilities of individual govern-
ments to act alone means that the most promising strategy to counter 
increasing inequality in the age of globalization are ones that globally 
harmonize worker protections and other social welfare policies. But 
putting such policies in place has been elusive. Despite efforts in the 
International Labour Organization, the World Trade Organization 
and even the G20, at the end of the day, the political will has not 
been sufficient to create strong global social welfare standards. On its 
face, this is paradoxical. If those lacking in economic privilege had the 
political clout to secure the implementation of strong worker protec-
tion and redistributionist policies in many countries during the twen-
tieth century, then why couldn't they aggregate their clout to convince 
governments collectively to harmonize such policies? 
While the answer is not simple, the unique dynamics of the inter-
state politics that defines the international system is of primary 
importance. Before the onslaught ' of globalization, the battle for 
worker protections and redistributionist policies were fought separ-
ately in each state. If the forces opposing such policies were successful 
in one country, it had little impact on the ability of other countries to 
pursue such policies. Now, because the competitive dynamics of 
globalization described above mean that any harmonization initiative 
must secure the participation of all states (or at least all of the states 
with any significant productive potential) the forces opposing such 
40 See for example Harold L. Wilensky, Rich Democracies: Political Economy, 
Public Policy and Performance (2002), pp. 211- 16. 
41 See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality, p. 278. ("Our system of 
global competition encourages firms to locate on the basis not of global 
efficiency but of tax competition . . . [ilt distorts the global economy and 
undermines the ability to impose fair taxation on capital.") 
:: 
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initiatives have gained a significant advantage. If they can capture 
policy in just a few, or even one of the states that are necessary for a 
harmonization agreement, they can effectively veto the ability of the 
rest of the world to maintain such policies. 
To make matters even harder for the forces of worker protections 
and equitable redistribution, the architecture of the global system is 
not congenial to the ability of citizens to coalesce transnationally. 
Within national parliamentary systems, those citizens in the middle 
and lower income stratums constitute a large percentage of the elect-
orate, generally allowing them to wield considerable power at the 
ballot box. What is more, through the pluralist democratic structures 
that are adjunct to parliamentary process,42 such citizens can over-
come geography as well as their many other ethnic, religious and 
ideological cleavages to join forces on behalf of their common eco-
nomic interest.43 
The role of citizens in the international system is quite different. 
Because international law is created by states, rather than through 
parliamentary voting by citizen elected representatives, the interstate 
system does not facilitate opportunities for citizens to formally par-
ticipate in the law making process.44 Without any institutional struc-
ture for bringing disparate communities together, language, ethnicity, 
religion, culture, nationalist ideology, and distance all conspire to 
make a collective response on behalf of common economic interests 
extremely difficult. For the most part, this means that the voices of 
those in the middle and lower income stratums are subsumed by 
those of their governments, regardless of whether such governments 
are captured by the interests of the wealthy or compromised in their 
ability to respond to inequality by the dynamics of globalization. 
42 For example, political parties and interest groups that lobby legislative bodies . 
43 See generally David Held, Models of Democracy (2006), pp. 160- 4. 
44 For one of the classic works discussing the limits of citizen politics in the 
international system, see Margaret E . Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activist 
Beyond Borders (\998). Other scholars have focused on participation by civil 
society organizations and epistemic networks in the international system. For 
some of the more influential works on participation by civil society 
organizations see Jessica T. Mathews, "Powershift," Foreign Aff., Jan.! 
Feb. 1997, p . 50; Jackie Smith, Social Movements for Global Democracy (2008). 
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III FUNCTIONALISM 
Pioneered by David Mitrany, whose writings spanned the period from 
the 1930s to the 1970s, functionalism was an attempt to find an 
intermediate position in international relations theory between what 
it regarded as the utopian legacy of Woodrow Wilson's belief in legally 
engineered grand transformations of the global institutional order and 
a bleak realist understanding that saw states as immutably locked in a 
Hobbesian competition that tended toward war.45 Functionalism 
held that international organizations could gradually play an ever 
greater role in human affairs as both governments and sub-state actors 
came to realize that regulatory matters requiring transnational 
cooperation could best be addressed at the transnational level through 
international organizations. 46 
A defining characteristic of functionalism is the nature of these 
organizations. They are to be designed to address the discreet prob-
lems that arise in defined areas of governance. By way of examples, 
Mitrany pointed to the need globally to coordinate intercontinental 
shipping, aviation and broadcasting.47 Thus, Mitrany's vision was of a 
myriad of distinct international organizations all functioning inde-
pendently in their own realms. As these organizations took on increas-
ing importance, functionalists believed that this would create a 
spillover effect. Political actors would gradually come to shift their 
political loyalties and activities to the international realm.48 
The primary implements of functionalist analysis were taken up in 
the 1950s by Ernst Haas and others to both explain and predict the 
transfer of rule-making authority from national governments to the 
45 See generally David Mitrany, The Progress of International Government. 
46 See David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (1966), pp. 93- 7 
47 Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (2000) . 
48 See Leon Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration 
(1963), p. 5 (explaining from the functionalist perspective, "[p]olitical 
integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national 
settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political 
activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand 
jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states"). 
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European Union in what came to be called neofunctionalism.49 Neo-
functionalism has in many ways defined the European integrationist 
project. Whether in neofunctionalism's prescription for step-by-step 
incrementalism that has become the European project's hallmark, or 
the early strategic primacy given to the technical governance of eco-
nomic arrangements, the neo-functionalist canons read like manuals 
to the construction of what today has become the European Union. 50 
Knocked around by the inevitable vicissitudes of a bold movement 
toward continental integration, neofunctionalism eventually fell out 
of favor. The most defining moment came in the 1970s when Haas, 
himself, declared that the theory was obsolete. 51 After the so-called 
"empty chair crisis," precipitated by French President Charles de 
Gaulle having put the brakes on the pace of integration in the mid 
49 For Haas's classic book inaugurating neofunctionalism, see Ernst Haas, The 
Uniting of Europe (1958). For other influential works, see Leon Lindberg, The 
Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration and Philippe Schmitter, 
Neo-Neo-functionalism (2004). 
50 For example the French Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950 (proposing the 
nascent institution that would one day become the European Union) embodies 
the neofunctionalist notion that narrowly tailored technical institutions of an 
economic nature could evolve far beyond their humble beginnings: 
"Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be 
built through concrete achievements which first create a defacto solidarity. The 
coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-
old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place 
concern these two countries. With this aim in view, the French Government 
proposes that action be taken immediately on one limited but decisive point. It 
proposes that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be 
placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an 
organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe. The 
pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting 
up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the 
federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have 
long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have 
been the most constant victims." 
See Press Conference, Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister (May 9, 
1950), transcript available at www.robert-schuman.orglrobert-schuman/ 
declaration2.htm. 
51 See Ernst Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (1975). 
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1960s, Haas became disillusioned that the predicted transfer of loyal-
ties had not materialized in his expected timeframe. 52 Regardless of 
the vagaries of their fashionability, most of the insights from function-
alism and neofunctionalism are more or less taken for granted today 
among the architects of Europe's future and are now subsumed into 
what has become regime theory and constructivism. 53 
In fact, looking back almost a century since functionalism's 
founding, the theory's early adherents seem almost prescient in their 
presaging of the development of the international system generally 
over the course of the twentieth century. The organizations that had 
universal pretentions such as the League of Nations and the United 
Nations have generally not lived up to their founder's aspirations, and 
grand schemes for world government, fashionable in the periods 
following both world wars, never came close to getting off the ground. 
What has been successful have been functionally focused international 
organizations such as the World Trade Organization, the Bretton 
Woods organizations, the World Health Organization, the Inter-
national Labour Organization and the like. While the United Nations 
lays claim to many as nominally part of the "UN family," in reality 
most important international organizations are created by independ-
ent treaties and function independently of the United Nations in all 
important matters. As functionalism predicted, these organization 
were established because of a perceived need to address concrete 
problems of a transnational nature and have tended to accrue greater 
powers incrementally over time. They have also had important spill-
over effects on the global system as a whole. As the current saliency of 
the discussion over fragmentation demonstrates, these organization 
have developed a complex ecology that has evolved into an institu-
tional order commonly thought of as our system of global governance. 
52 Sec James Caporaso and John Keeler, The Europeall UI/iol/ alld Regiollal 
1I1legralioll TheO/)!, in The Slale of rhe Ellropeall Ullioll ( 1995) (chronicling of the 
risc and fall of nco-functionalist thcory). 
53 For an argumcnt that neofunctionalism accuratcly prcdictcd how European 
legal as opposcd to political intcgration would procccd, scc Annc-Maric Burlcy 
[Slaughtcr) and Waltcr Mattli, "Europc bcfol·C thc Court," 1111'1 Org., 41, 
(1993), p.47. 
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For our purposes, what can be most productively distilled from 
functionalism and neofunctionalism are the insights that the greatest 
political impetus for the establishment of a new international organ-
ization are concrete problems that can be most effectively addressed 
internationally, that single regimes are more likely to be politically 
viable than overarching constitutional schemes, and that over time 
such organizations are likely to grow in influence as they gain the 
loyalties of their constituents . As I will now discuss, these insights 
from functionalism can help us understand why the creation of a 
Global Parliamentary Assembly (GPA) is now a viable political 
project. 
IV FUNCTIONALISM, INEQUALITY, AND THE 
VIABILITY OF A GLOBAL PARLIAMENTARY 
ASSEMBLY 
Critics claim that a GPA is a utopian project that cannot be realized. 54 
In making this assertion they conflate the introduction of an inde-
pendent functionalist representative institution of limited powers with 
grand legalist schemes for comprehensive world government. They 
confuse the step-by-step organic vision of global institutional devel-
opment that the functionalists saw as the practical way forward with 
the revolutionary one that they considered unworkable. Certainly, a 
parliament of a plenary nature is a unique kind of functional insti-
tution, different from more narrowly-focused organizations designed 
to address discreet areas of governance. Nevertheless, it meets the 
54 See for example Paul Kennedy, The Parliament of Man, The Past, Present and 
Future of the United Nations (2006), p. 214 ("The practical and political 
problems with this sort of utopian thought are numerous. "); Kenneth 
Anderson, "Accountability as 'Legitimacy': Global Governance, Global Civil 
Society and the United Nations," Brooklyn]. Int'! L., 36 (2011), p. 871 
("Some dreamers dreamed - and still do - of a planetary parliament directly 
eJected by populations around the world. Most others - even many who are 
otherwise deeply committed to tlle political ideals of global governance in a 
globally federal system - accept that planetary democracy in that sense is 
meaningless and unachievable.") (foomote omitted). 
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functionalist test of being a self-contained entity with its own specific 
mission, and after over half a century of proliferating functional 
organizations, global system coherence can be most effectively 
achieved by an institution whose function is to link these organiza-
tions. Mitrany, himself, anticipated the potential need for such an 
institution 55 and prescribed that it be conceived with reference to the 
same functionalist principles as apply to the initiation of other inter-
national organizations: 
As the whole sense of this particular method is to let activities be 
organized as the need for joint action arises and is accepted, it 
would be out of place to lay down in advance some formal plan for 
the coordination of various functions. Coordination too, would in 
that sense have to corne about functionally.56 
In this period of authoritarian resurgence, if the international system 
is to meaningfully further democracy by example (rather than mere 
rhetoric), it is appropriate that a representative parliament would play 
this coordination role. Because it is well established in the popular 
imagination that parliaments promulgate laws and oversee agencies of 
government, a GPA, once realized, would be poised to evolve over 
time into playing a central role in the international system as the 
vertical link to the citizenry and the horizontal link between the 
various international organizations. 
True, however, to the functionalist understanding of how the 
international system develops incrementally, the GPA should not 
initially be given formal powers of law-making and oversight. At this 
point in history such a bold grant of authority would almost certainly 
be rejected by governments jealous of their own prerogatives. In 
accepting such a concession to reality, the question then becomes 
55 "The question will be asked . . . in what manner and to what degree the various 
functional agencies that may thus grow up would have to be linked to each 
other and articulated as parts of a more comprehensive organization. It should 
be clear that each agency could work by itself, but that does not exclude the 
possibility of some of them or all being bound in some way together, if it 
should be found needful or useful to do so." David Mitrany, A Working Peace 
System, p. 107. That indeed is the test. 
56 Ibid . 
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whether a GPA lacking in formal powers could actually have an 
impact on income distribution and by extension the global economy. 
I have rehearsed arguments above that globalization has exacer-
bated the problem of economic inequality, that the resulting lack of 
aggregate demand threatens the health of the global economy, and 
that the domestic realm is limited in its ability to redress the problem. 
A GPA could provide the political underpinnings for such redress. 
Unlike the current configuration of power, a GPA would facilitate 
citizens' ability to organize transnationally, and it would overcome the 
capacity of those who wish to maintain the economic status quo to 
block equality initiatives by winning the day in single jurisdictions. 
Able to coalesce in the parliament's democratic space, supporters of 
greater economic equality could petition the organization to endorse 
their programs. Despite the GPA's lack of formal powers, as the 
world's only body with a direct claim to represent the global citizenry 
as a whole, its decisions would likely be very influential and serve as 
reference points for discussion and debate. 
As the planet's organized citizenry began to reconfigure itself 
beyond the limitations of separate and discreet orbits around national 
parliaments into a new common orbit around a GPA, over time the 
parliament's formal powers might well come to reflect this new polit-
ical reality. Not only would the organized citizenry be inclined toward 
supporting the legal force of legislative results that were fashioned in 
response to their input, but an existing GPA could powerfully lobby 
governments on behalf of expanding its own powers . In a world where 
democratic elections have become the litmus test for legitimate gov-
ernance at the local, provincial and national levels, GPA's claim to 
exercise increasing authority in the name of the global citizenry would 
be hard to resist. 
If a parliament would give an effective global voice to those repre-
senting the less economically well off, then wouldn't those powerful 
elements of the economic elite whose wage costs and tax burdens 
have been kept low by the current global configuration of power resist 
the GPA based upon their perception of self-interest? No doubt many 
would. As I have discussed, however, everyone has a shared interest in 
a global economy that can function at as close to full capacity as 
possible. It is said in the United States that President Franklin 
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Roosevelt "saved capitalism" by using Keynesian tools to create a 
social safety net and stimulate demand in response to the Great 
Depression.57 Many in the moneyed class opposed Roosevelt, but 
with his core of support among the working class, enough believed it 
to be either ethical or in their own enlightened self-interest to support 
him, for his plans to be implemented. As this discussion of economic 
inequality reveals, a GPA is at least in part about establishing a global 
political structure that could support a social safety net, and the same 
dynamic could at some point potentially play out in its creation. 
It is one thing, of course, for a functional argument to be useful 
and viable as a practical political project and quite another to actually 
get the institution off the ground. The potential organizational cata-
lyst for such a parliament has been building primarily around the 
German based, Campaign for a United Nations Parliamentary 
Assembly.58 The organization holds conferences, issues papers, and 
builds political support for an international parliament. To date, over 
1,000 past and present national parliamentarians and other moral 
authority figures have endorsed the Campaign's call for a parliament 
associated with the United Nations.59 
Mirroring these organizational developments has been a growing 
academic discourse. In addition to the work that Richard Falk and 
I have done proposing a GPA, leading scholars of cosmopolitan 
democracy such as Daniele Archibugi and David Held are widely 
cited,60 and many others have contributed to the broader discussion 
of global democracy.61 
57 See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The Crisis of the Old Order; 
The Corning of the New Deal; and The Politics of Upheaval (1959) (arguing 
famously that Roosevelt saved capitalism from self-destruction and preserved 
democracy from authoritarianism of both the left and right) . 
58 See the Campaign's website at www.unpacampaign.org/ 
59 http://en.unpacampaign.org!supportlindex.php. 
60 For representative works, see Daniele Archibugi and David Held (eds.) 
Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order (1995); Daniele 
Archibugi, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan 
Democracy (2008). 
61 The literature in the field has grown large. For a representative sampling of 
works by those both supporting a parliamentary approach and those opposing 
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Finally, and most importantly, the project for the first time has 
found its way onto the United Nations agenda. Both the United 
Nations Human Rights Council and the General Assembly have 
begun considering the matter. In October of2011 the Human Rights 
Council adopted Resolution 18/6 calling for "the promotion of a 
democratic and just international order,,,62 and in December of 
2012, the General Assembly adopted Resolution NRes/67/175 on 
"the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order.,,63 
In their respective resolutions, each of the bodies in very general 
language affirms that a democratic and equitable international order 
requires "the promotion and consolidation of transparent, democratic, 
just and accountable international institutions in all areas of cooper-
ation, in particular through the implementation of the principle of full 
and equal participation in their respective decision-making me chan-
isms.,,64 The latest General Assembly resolution A/Res/681175 passed 
in December 2013 goes further, and in more specific language declares 
that everyone is "entitled to a democratic and equitable international 
order,,,65 and that among the requirements of such an order is "the 
one, see Raffaele Marchetti, Global Democracy: For and Against: Ethical Theory, 
Institutional Design and Social Struggle (2008); Tony McGrew, Transnational 
Democracy: Theories and Prospects (Institute for History, International and 
Social Studies, 2004); Philip Pettit, "Democracy National and International," 
The Monist, 89 (2006), p. 301; Andrew Moravcsik, "Is there a Democratic 
Deficit in World Politics? A Framework for Analysis," Gov't & Opposition, 30 
(2004), p. 336; Robert E. Goodin, "Global Democracy: in the Beginning," 
Int'l Theory, 2 (2010), p. 175; Daniel Bray, "Pragmatic Cosmopolitanism: 
A Deweyian Approach to Democracy Beyond the Nation-State," Millennium 
J. Int'l Studies, 37 (2009), p. 683; Pila-Noora Kauppi, Jo Leinen, Graham 
Watson, Gerard Onesta, The Case/or Global Democracy: Advocating a United 
Nations Parliamentary Assembly (2007); Pascal Lamy, Toward World Democracy 
(2005); Mattias Koenig-Archibugi, "Is Global Democracy Possible," Eur. 
J. Int'l ReI., 17 (2011), p. 519. 
62 H.R.C. Res 18/6, UN Doc. AlHRC/RES18/6 (October 13, 2011) . 
6 3 G.A. Res. 67/ 175, UN Doc. A RES/67/175 (December 20, 2012). 
64 H.R.C. Res 18/6, ~ 6(g), UN Doc. AlHRC/RES18/6 (October 13, 2011); 
H .R.C. Res 18/6, UN Doc. AlHRC/RES18/6 (October 13, 2011) . G.A. 
Res. 67/175, ~ 4(g), UN Doc. A RES/67/175 (December 20 2012). 
65 G.A. Res. 68/175, ~ 5, UN Doc. A RES/68/175 (December 20, 2013). 
214 International Law and Its Discontents 
right to equitable participation of all, without any discrimination, in 
domestic and global decision-making. ,,66 This places within the realm 
of international discussion how all seven billion citizens on the planet 
can equitably participate in global decision-making without discrimin-
ation outside of some sort of parliamentary structure. 
The Human Rights Council in its resolution 18/6, decided to 
establish a mandate for an independent expert on the prom otion of 
a democratic and equitable international order in part to, "identify 
best practices in the promotion and protection of a democratic inter-
national order at the local, national, regional and international 
levels,,,67 and the General Assembly in its resolution calls for cooper-
ation with the independent expert. 68 
The independent expert, Alfred de Zayas, in his subsequent 
reports to both the Human Rights Council69 and the General Assem-
bly has called for consideration of a parliament. 7o H e wrote, for 
example, in his report to the General Assembly: 
Among other civil society initiatives, the launching of a World 
Parliamentary Assembly or United Nations Parliamentary 
Assembly is worth exploring. As fonner Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated: "A United Nations Parliamentary 
Assembly - a global body of elected representatives - could 
invigorate our institutions of global governance with 
unprecedented democratic legitimacy, transparency and 
accountability." The idea is to remedy democracy deficits by 
giving voice to global public opinion, including citizens in global 
decision-making through elected officials. Such an Assembly 
could be set up by a vote of the General Assembly under 
66 G.A. Res. 681175,,\ 5 (h), UN Doc. A RES/68/ 175 (D ecember 20,20 13). 
67 H.R.C. Res 18/6, ' \ 14 (b), UN Doc. NH RC/RES18/6 (October 13,2011 ). 
68 G.A. Res. 67/175, ~ 13 & 14, UN Doc. A RES/67/ 175 (December 20,20 12). 
69 Independent Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable 
International Order, R eport of the Ilidependem Expert 0 11 the Promoti01I of a 
Democratic and Equitable Imernaciollal Order, A lfred-Maurice de Zayas, delivered 
to the Human Rig/us Coul/cil, UN Doc. N HRC/24/38 Guly 1,20 13). 
70 Independent Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable 
International Order, Reporc of the Ilidepe1/dem Expert on the Prol1lotio1/ of a 
Democratic and Equitable Imenwtional Order, Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, del£vered 
to the General Assembly, UN Doc. N68/284 (August, 7, 2013) . 
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Article 22 of the Charter or it could be created on the basis of a 
new international treaty between governments, followed by an 
agreement linking it to the United Nations. Neither mechanism 
requires Charter amendment or reform. Global decisions would 
gain greater legitimacy through citizen input and involvement in 
an independent World Assembly with consultative functions, or 
in a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly representing people 
as well as states. 71 
De Zayas recommends Article 22 of the Charter and an independent 
treaty as the two most viable vehicles for creating the GPA. I agree. 72 
The Charter under Article 22 provides that "the General Assembly may 
establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the perform-
ance of its functions.,,7 3 Article 22 has the advantage that, unlike the 
treaty process, a General Assembly resolution could bring the GPA into 
being without the cumbersome requirement of state ratification.74 
Resorting to Article 22, however, is not without its own draw-
backs. Perhaps most significant, garnering the requisite support for 
the approval of the GPA within the General Assembly is likely to 
require problematic political concessions. A lowest common denom-
inator parliament, for example, might allow for authoritarian regimes 
to appoint members to the GPA, or even worse, orchestrate elections 
that would produce sham results. This would undermine the legitim-
acy of the organization and compromise its ability to act as a counter-
weight to authoritarianism.75 
This is why Richard Falk and I have favored the GPA being 
initiated as an independent treaty body76 adopted by whichever 
7 1 Id'i 23 and 24. 
72 See Andrew Strauss, "On the First Branch of Global Governance," Widener 
L. Rev., 13 (2007), p. 347 (describing four potential ways of creating a global 
parliament and concluding that the treaty approach is the most practicable). 
73 UN Charter, art. 22. 
74 For further discussion, see Andrew Strauss, "On the First Branch of Global 
Governance," pp. 352- 4 . 
75 Ibid. 
76 Professor Falk and I have made the case for a treaty-based approach in several 
publications, including Foreign Affairs and The Nation. See Richard Falk and 
Andrew Strauss, "Toward Global Parliament," ForeignAfj., 80 (2001), p. 212; 
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internationally progressive countries were willing to be pioneers. 77 
Countries that are truly supportive of the GPA's democratic mission 
are likely to create the best, most democratic organization. Even 
twenty to thirty such countries (as long as they are economically 
and geographically diverse) would be enough to found the GPA, and 
opposing countries in the General Assembly could not stand in their 
way. Once the parliamentary initiative gained momentum, their less 
enthusiastic peers in the United Nations would have an incentive to 
take part rather than be sidelined, and there might even come a time 
when it would be politically untenable for authoritarian govern-
ments to deny their people the right to vote in the only globally 
elected body. 
The treaty agreed to by the founders would establish the legal 
structure for elections to be held within their national territories 
including a voting system and electoral districts. In addition, an 
operational framework for the GPA, including its mandate and 
limitations on its powers would be included in the treaty as would 
a provision for future accession by other countries. Any country 
could later join the GPA so long as it was willing to meet its obliga-
tions under the treaty, the most important of which would be to 
allow its citizens to vote representatives to the GPA in free and fair 
elections. 
The treaty could include provisions defining the GPA's initial role 
vis-a-vis the United Nations, and once established the parliament 
Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, "Toward a Global Parliament," The 
Nation, September 22, 2003, p. 28. 
77 A standalone treaty organization whose membership may not be the same as 
the United Nations is not a novel concept. Most major international bodies 
such as the Bretton Woods organizations, the World Trade Organization and 
the World Health Organization, to name but a few, have been created in this 
way. Most significant, this approach was used to establish the International 
Criminal Court, whose membership famously does not include the United 
States, nor for that matter Russia or China (though Russia is a signatory). In 
the case of the International Criminal Court, specific treaty provisions align 
that organization's processes with those of the United Nations. Most 
significant are terms providing for the Security Council to refer criminal cases 
to the Court. 
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could enter into a relationship agreement with that body.78 Though 
begun independent of the United Nations, the GPA would be meant 
to strengthen it. Part of the GPA's treaty-based responsibilities, for 
example, could be to weigh in with its own vote on issues such as 
global income inequality. General Assembly resolutions are them-
selves largely recommendatory, and by insinuating a democratic voice 
into the process, the resolutions that passed both bodies would be 
more noticed and deemed more legitimate. Backed by the weight of 
popular authority over time, perhaps the General Assembly and the 
GPA could evolve together into a truly bicameral legislative system 
capable of producing binding legislation. 
V CONCLUSION: RETURNING TO EINSTEIN 
AND FREUD 
While Freud did not accept the presumed supposition that a compel-
ling case for a world authority to avoid war could in itself be the 
impetus for such an authority, he did maintain a dynamic view of 
history. Influenced profoundly by German Romanticism, he believed 
that human civilization evolves as the individual psyche evolves, in the 
eternal struggle between the instincts of love (Eros, sexuality, that 
which unites) and death (aggressiveness and destruction). 79 In this 
sense Freud and Einstein, together with the politically scientific func-
tionalists, all share a common perspective that embraces the reality of 
historical change. And, by almost any measure, we are living in a time 
of tremendous historical dynamism. 
Viewed from the vantage point of the individual human psyche, 
today more of us on the planet than ever before have access to the 
78 The UN Charter provides that: "The Economic and Social Council may enter 
into agreements with any" agency "established by intergovernmental 
agreement and having wide international responsibilities." UN Charter 
art. 63, para. 1; ibid . at art. 57, para.!. These agreements "defin[e] the terms 
on which the agency concerned shall be brought into relationship with the 
United Narions[,]" and "shall be subject to approval by the General 
Assembly." UN Charter art. 63, para. 1. 
79 See Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents. 
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education that allows us, in Freud's teons, to be "strengthening the 
intellect" so as to "master our instinctive lives."ao Seen alternatively 
from Einstein's rationalist orientation, the increasingly rapid globaliza-
tion of the planetary social order that technology has wrought has 
intensified the reflective case that we create a viable international 
system. Similarly, as I have argued in this chapter, in this globalized 
world, the dynamics of the functionalist variant of the political scientific 
tradition leads self-interested actors in the direction of collective action. 
The extent to which the dynamism of the system will translate into 
any particular global institutional innovation is unknown. If planetary 
civilization, however, is to continue the long-teon trend toward par-
liamentary democracy and toward greater planetary social integra-
tion, then presumably these two trend lines will at some point 
converge in the establishment of a globally democratic institution. 
That day may not be as far off as some people might imagine. For 
decades now the international community has been experimenting 
successfully with transnational parliamentary institutions, the most 
well-known of which is the citizen elected European Parliament.a1 
Our functionalist study of the role that income inequality could play 
in the establishment of a GPA provides a framework for understand-
ing the social mechanisms animating such an institutional develop-
ment and presages the role that such an institution could play. 
80 Ibid., pp. 11-12. For example, according to the World Bank, in just the short 
period between 2004 and 2012, the worldwide percentage of children enrolled 
in secondary school increased from 63 percent to 73 percent. See The World 
Bank, Working for a World Free of Poverty, School Enrollment, Secondary, 
available at http://data.woridbank.orgiindicator/SE.SEC.ENRRlcountries/ 
1 W?display=graph. 
81 That democratic body has come to have significant powers as one of the three 
law-making institutions of the European Union. Among the more well-known 
of the other institutions are: the citizen-elected Central American Parliament, 
in operation since 1991; the ten-year-old Pan-African Parliament, composed 
of members elected by African national parliaments; the Council of Europe's 
parliamentary assembly composed of members of national parliaments; and 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the North 
American Treaty Organization and Mercosur parliaments also composed of 
national parliamentarians. 
